We propose to bring together two conceptually complementary ideas: (1) selfcon…rm-ing equilibrium (SCE): at rest points of learning dynamics in a game played recurrently, agents best respond to con…rmed beliefs, i.e., beliefs consistent with the evidence they accumulated, and (2) ambiguity aversion: agents, other things being equal, prefer to bet on events with known rather than unknown probabilities and, more generally, distinguish objective from subjective uncertainty, a behavioral trait captured by their ambiguity attitudes.
Introduction
Uncertainty about variables a¤ecting the consequences of choices is inherent to situations of strategic interaction. This is quite obvious when such situations have been faced only a few times. In this paper, we argue that uncertainty is pervasive also in games played recurrently where agents have had the opportunity to collect a large set of observations and the system has settled into a steady state. Such a situation is captured by the selfcon…rming equilibrium concept (also called conjectural equilibrium). In a selfcon…rming equilibrium (henceforth, SCE) agents best respond to con…rmed probabilistic beliefs, where "con…rmed" means that their beliefs are consistent with the evidence they can collect, given the strategies they adopt. Of course this evidence depends on how everybody else plays.
The SCE concept can be framed within di¤erent scenarios. A simple scenario is just a repeated game with a …xed set of players. In this context, the constituent game, which is being repeated, may have sequential moves and monitoring may be imperfect. To avoid repeated game e¤ects, it is assumed that players do not value their future payo¤s, but simply best respond to their updated beliefs about the current period strategies of the opponents. Here instead we refer to a scenario that is more appropriate for the ideas we want to explore: there is a large society of individuals who play recurrently a given game , possibly a sequential game with chance moves: for each player/role i in (male or female, buyer or seller, etc.) there is a large population of agents who play in role i. Agents are drawn at random and matched to play . Then, they are separated and re-matched to play with (almost certainly) di¤erent co-players, and so on. After each play of a game in which he was involved, an agent obtains some evidence on how the game was played. The accumulated evidence is the data set used by the agent to update his beliefs. Note, there is an intrinsic limitation to the evidence that an agent can obtain: at most he can observe the path (terminal node) realized in the game he just played, but often he can observe even less, e.g., only his monetary payo¤s. However, what each agent is really interested about is the statistical distribution of strategies in the populations corresponding to opponents'roles, as such distributions determine (via random matching) the objective probabilities of di¤erent strategy pro…les of the opponents with whom he is matched. Typically, this distribution is not uniquely identi…ed by long-run frequencies of observations. This de…nes the fundamental inference problem faced by an agent, and explains why uncertainty is pervasive also in steady states. Similar considerations hold for chance moves, when their probabilities are unknown.
The key di¤erence between SCE and Nash equilibrium is that, in a SCE, agents may have incorrect beliefs because many possible underlying distributions are consistent with the empirical frequencies they observe. The following example clari…es this point (see Levine 1993a, Fudenberg and Kreps 1995) . In the "horse" game of Figure 1 , player 0 is an indi¤erent player 2 and the dashed line represents his information set. Assuming that agents can observe ex post the terminal node, or their realized payo¤, there is an SCE with the following features: (1) all agents of population 1 play A believing that R is very likely and that all agents in 2 play a, (2) and all agents of population 2 play a believing that L is very likely and that all agents in 1 play A. The resulting outcome is always (A; a). Of course, someone must be wrong, but all beliefs are consistent with the evidence, i.e., they are con…rmed. On the other hand, in a Nash equilibrium beliefs about player 0 must be correct, hence they must agree: if R is (believed) more likely, 1 and 2 play (A; d); if L is (believed) more likely, 1 chooses D. There is no Nash equilibrium with outcome (A; a).
According to the traditional SCE concept, agents are Bayesian subjective expected utility (SEU) maximizers. Nevertheless, when a set of underlying distributions is consistent with their information, agents face a condition of model uncertainty, or ambiguity, rather than risk. It is therefore plausible to assume that they have non-Bayesian attitudes toward uncertainty and decide accordingly. Many models of choice capturing such attitudes have been studied in decision theory (see Gilboa and Marinacci, 2011 ). The decision theoretic work which is more germane to our approach distinguishes between objective and subjective uncertainty. Given a set S of states, there is a set (S) of possible probabilistic "models." 3 Each 2 speci…es the objective probabilities of states and, for each action a of the decision maker (DM), a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility evaluation U (a; ); the DM is uncertain about the true model (see Cerreia-Vioglio et al, 2011b ). In our framework, a is the action, or strategy, of an agent playing in role i, is a distribution of strategies in the population of opponents (or a pro…le of such distributions in n-person games), and is the set of distributions consistent with the database of the agent. Roughly, an agent who dislikes the uncertainty about the expected utility value implied by uncertainty about the model prefers, other things being equal, a strategy a inducing a small range of expected utilities fU (a; ) : 2 g to a strategy b inducing a large range of expected utilities fU (b; ) : 2 g.
We interchangeably refer to such feature of preferences with the expression "aversion to model uncertainty"or the shorter "ambiguity aversion."For example, an extreme form of ambiguity aversion is the Waldean maxmin criterion: max a min 2 U (a; ). 4 In this paper we span a large set of ambiguity attitudes using the "smooth ambiguity"model of Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005, henceforth KMM) . This latter criterion admits the Waldean criterion as a limit case and the Bayesian SEU criterion as a special case. In a SCE, agents in each role best respond to their database choosing actions with the highest value, and their database is the one that obtains under the true data generating process corresponding to the actual strategy distributions. The following example shows how this notion of SCE di¤ers from the traditional, or Bayesian, SCE. In the zero-sum game 5 of Figure 2 , the …rst player chooses between an outside option O and two Matching-Pennies subgames, say M P 1 and M P 2 . Subgame M P 2 has "higher stakes" than M P 1 : it has a higher (mixed) maxmin value (2 > 1:5), but a lower minimum payo¤ (0 < 1). In this game there is only one Bayesian SCE outcome, 6 which must be the unique Nash outcome: M P 2 is reached with probability 1 and half of the agents in each population play Head. But we argue informally that moderate aversion to uncertainty makes the low-stakes subgame M P 1 reachable, and high aversion to uncertainty makes the outside option O also possible. 7 Speci…cally, let p k denote the subjective probability assigned by a Bayesian agent in role 1 to h k , with k = 1; 2. Going to the low-stake subgame M P 1 has subjective value maxf p 1 + 1; 2 p 1 )g 1:5 and going to the high-stakes subgame M P 2 has subjective value maxf4 p 2 ; 4(1 p 2 )g 2. Thus, O is never a Bayesian best reply and cannot be played by a positive fraction of agents in a Bayesian SCE. Furthermore, also the low-stakes subgame M P 1 cannot be played in a Bayesian SCE. For suppose by way of contradiction that a positive fraction of agents in population 1 played M P 1 . In the long run, each one of these agents, and all agents in population 2, would learn the relative frequencies of Head and Tail. Since in a SCE agents best respond to con…rmed beliefs, the relative frequencies of Head and Tail should be the same in equilibrium, i.e., the agents in population 1 playing M P 1 would learn that its objective expected utility is 1:5 < 2 and would deviate to M P 2 to maximize their SEU. On the other hand, for agents who are (at least) moderately averse to model uncertainty and keep playing M P 1 , having learned the risks involved with the low-stakes subgame confers to reduced-form 8 strategies H 1 and T 1 a kind of "status quo advantage": the objective expected utility of the untried strategies H 2 and T 2 is unknown and therefore they are penalized. Thus, the low-stakes subgame M P 1 can be played by a positive fraction of agents if they are su¢ ciently averse to model uncertainty. Finally, also the outside option O can be played by a positive fraction of agents in a SCE if they are extremely averse to model uncertainty, as represented by the maxmin criterion. If an agent keeps playing O, he cannot learn anything about the opponents'strategy distribution, hence he deems possible every distribution, or model, 2 . Therefore, the minimum expected utility of H 1 (resp. T 1 ) is 1 and the minimum expected utility of H 2 (resp. T 2 ) is zero, justifying O as a maxmin best reply. 9 The example shows that, by combining the SCE and ambiguity aversion ideas, a kind of "status quo bias" emerges: in the long run, uncertainty about the expected utility of tested strategies disappears, but uncertainty about the expected utility of the untested ones does not. Therefore, ambiguity averse agents have weaker incentives to deviate than Bayesian agents. More generally, higher ambiguity aversion implies a weaker incentive to deviate from an equilibrium strategy. This explains the main result of the paper: the set of SCEs expands as ambiguity aversion increases. We make this precise by adopting the "smooth ambiguity" model of KMM, which conveniently separates the endogenous subjective beliefs about the true strategy distribution from the exogenous ambiguity attitudes, so that the latter can be partially ordered by an intuitive "more ambiguity averse than" relation. With this, we provide a de…nition of "Smooth SCE" whereby agents "smooth best respond" to beliefs about strategy distributions consistent with their long-run frequencies of observations. The traditional SCE concept is obtained when agents are ambiguity neutral, i.e., Bayesian, while a Waldean (maxmin) SCE concept obtains as a limit case when agents are in…nitely ambiguity averse. By our comparative statics result, these equilibrium concepts are intuitively nested from …ner to coarser: each Bayesian SCE is also a Smooth SCE, which in turn is also Waldean SCE.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we start describing the main idea within recurrent decision problems where the state of nature has an unknown distribution. In Section 3 we analyze games and provide de…nitions of SCE with non-Bayesian attitudes toward uncertainty. In Section 4, the core of the paper, we carry out some key comparative statics exercises and analyze the relationships between equilibrium concepts. Section 5 illustrates our concepts and results with a detailed analysis of a generalized version of the game of Figure 2 . Section 6 explores the consequences of allowing commitment to objective randomization devices, showing that this considerably reduces the status quo bias due to ambiguity aversion. Section 7 concludes the paper with a detailed discussion of some important theoretical issues and of the most related literature. In the main text we provide informal intuitions for our results. All proofs are collected in the Appendix. 8 H k (resp. T k ) corresponds to the class of realization-equivalent strategies that choose subgame M P k and then select H k (resp. T k ). 9 Note that we are excluding the possibility of mixing through randomization, an issue addressed in Section 6.
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Recurrent decisions
We …rst introduce our concepts in the context of a recurrent decision problem where the outcome of the decision maker's (henceforth, DM) strategy depends on the state (or strategy) of Nature.
Mathematics
Given any measurable space (X; X ), we denote by (X) the collection of all probability measures : X ! [0; 1]. When X is …nite, say with cardinality n, we assume that X = 2 X and we identify (X) with the simplex of R n .
We endow (X) with the smallest -algebra that makes the real valued and bounded functions on (X), of the form 7 ! (E), measurable for all E 2 X . When X is …nite this -algebra coincides with the relative Borel -algebra that (X) inherits as the simplex of R n . Finally, we also endow any measurable subset of (X) with the relative -algebra inherited from (X), and we denote by ( ) the collection of all probability measures de…ned on such -algebra. Among them, x denotes the Dirac measure concentrated on x 2 X. 10
Given (X; X ) and (Y; Y), a pair of measurable spaces, we endow the Cartesian product X Y with the product -algebra X Y. We denote by (X) (Y ) the collection of all product probability measures. Moreover, each measurable function ' : X ! Y induces the pushforward map' : (X) ! (Y ) de…ned bŷ
In other words, we have that'( )(E) = (' 1 (E)) for all E 2 Y. Finally, (X) denotes the collection of all a¢ ne functions ' : (X) ! R, that is,
The decision problem
We assume there is a large population of DMs. 11 In each period, each of them faces the same decision problem which consists of a …nite state space S N , a …nite strategy space S DM , and a …nite outcome space Z. This may be a dynamic decision problem representable by a decision tree with moves by the DM and moves by Nature. In this case S i , with i 2 fDM; N g, is the set of pure strategies of i. In this paper we do not address dynamic consistency issues: we assume that the DM commits to a particular strategy that is automatically implemented in the decision problem. Hence S DM is the set of actions which DMs can choose from and, to ease notation, we write A in place of S DM and in place of S N .
An outcome function :
The existence of many DMs plays an important role only in our game-theoretic analysis. Nevertheless, in order to be consistent, we mention it also in this section even though we mainly focus on a speci…c DM. 6 maps actions and states to "outcomes."The set of outcomes Z should be interpreted as the set of terminal nodes of the decision tree. 12 Such terminal nodes give rise to consequences c 2 C according to a function 13 : Z ! C.
Ex post, DMs receive a message m 2 M according to a feedback function
The function f maps outcomes to messages. A DM that gets message m knows that the realized outcome belongs to the set f 1 (m) Z.
Together the outcome and the feedback functions determine the message function
! M be the section at strategy a of F de…ned by F a (!) = F (a; !) for all ! 2 . When each F a is one-to-one, under each action di¤erent states of Nature generate di¤erent messages. Thus, ex post DMs learn the true state upon receiving the message. This, however, can happen when two conditions are satis…ed: (i) each section a is one-to-one, i.e., in the decision tree Nature has no move following a move by the DM, and (ii) the feedback function f is one-to-one, i.e., there is perfect feedback. Note that under perfect feedback it is without loss of generality to set M = Z and f = Id Z , the identity function on Z.
Elements of ( ) are interpreted as the vectors of "objective" probabilities that each state ! obtains, that is, as possible probabilistic models for states. If the decision problem is viewed as a game with Nature, then is a mixed strategy of Nature. Thus, the true model can be seen as Nature's actual mixed play.
Elements of (A) can be seen as mixed actions implemented by a random device, 14 or -in our preferred interpretation -as statistical distributions of actions in the population of DMs. In both cases, (a) is the "objective" probability that the DM (or a DM chosen at random) selects a.
A distribution on A , in particular a product distribution , delivers a random message. Speci…cally, each message function
is the probability that a DM observes an ex post message m given the product measure of a mixed action and a model . We will mostly take the point of view of a DM who chooses a pure action a, but we will also consider the case of randomization, hence our general notation. We denote by a generic mixed message in (M ).
Decision criteria
The stage decision problem features two sources of uncertainty: state uncertainty within each model and model uncertainty across di¤erent models.
As to state uncertainty, given a model the DMs evaluate actions a through their expected utility
where u = v : Z ! R and v : C ! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern (henceforth, vNM) utility function that captures the attitudes toward risk of the DM. 15 Our main results rely on the assumption that payo¤ s are observable: the payo¤ function u is f -measurable, that is, in a …nite setting, f (z) = f (z 0 ) implies u (z) = u(z 0 ) for all z; z 0 2 Z. This is a natural assumption in many applications, e.g., when c 2 C is DM's consumption.
As to model uncertainty, let U (a; ) : ( ) ! R be the a¢ ne function that, given an action a, associates to each model its expected utility (2) . Suppose that, based on his information, the DM knows that the true model belongs to a compact subset ( ). In other words, he is able to posit a set of possible models, a standard assumption in classical statistics. The payo¤ scope of model uncertainty for the DM that chooses action a is thus described by the expected utility pro…le fU (a; ) : 2 g.
The simplest criterion to deal with both state and model uncertainty is the Waldean criterion, which ranks actions according to
This criterion, due to Wald (1950) , does not assume any knowledge on models other than what is necessary to posit . In particular, no prior probability appears. In contrast, the classical Bayesian criterion 16 ranks actions according to V (a; p; ) = Z U (a; ) dp ( )
where p 2 ( ) is a prior probability on the possible models, a subjective probability that quanti…es the DM's personal information on models. Set
The reduced probability p 2 ( ) is the predictive probability on states induced by the prior p. Using the predictive probability, we can write Z U (a; ) dp
The predictive form U (a; p) is a "reduced form"of (4) . Note that p is a subjective probability, so that U (a; p) is a subjective expected utility criterion a la Savage (1954) , while U (a; ) was a vNM one.
DMs may well be ambiguity averse, that is, they may dislike having a range of possible vNM expected utilities fU (a; ) : 2 g that is not a singleton because of model uncertainty. For this reason the classical smooth ambiguity criterion of KMM ranks actions according to V (a; p; ; ) = 1 Z (U (a; )) dp ( )
where p 2 ( ) is a prior probability on and : Im U ! R is a strictly increasing continuous function that describes ambiguity attitudes. 17 In particular, a concave captures ambiguity aversion, while a linear corresponds to ambiguity neutrality. The smooth criterion thus relaxes the assumption that agents linearly combine attitudes toward state and toward model uncertainty, which are allowed to di¤er.
The Waldean and classical Bayesian criteria can be viewed as, respectively, a limit case and a special case of the classical smooth criterion. For, under ambiguity neutrality the smooth model reduces to the Bayesian one (4), while under extreme ambiguity aversion -that is, when ambiguity aversion "goes to in…nity" -the smooth model reduces to the limit to the Wald criterion (3) provided that supp(p) = . We refer the reader to KMM for details. Note that the Bayesian criterion can be written as V (a; p; ; Id R ) as a special smooth criterion; to ease notation in what follows we will keep writing V (a; p; ).
We will also consider the possibility that a DM can delegate his choice to a random device, thus implementing a mixed strategy 2 (A). All the formulas above can be adapted, replacing a with and U (a; ) with the vNM expected utility
(a)U (a; ).
Recurrent decisions and status quo
The decision problem is faced recurrently by a large population of DMs. In each period one of them is drawn at random and faces the stage decision problem. In most of the paper we assume that DMs select pure actions a. Mixed actions are interpreted as population action distributions, that is, (a) is the fraction of DMs who choose a when selected for the stage decision problem. In a classical approach a la Laplace, this fraction is the "objective" probability that a DM drawn at random chooses a. Formally, action distributions and mixed actions are identical, in the spirit of the Nash mass action interpretation (see, e.g., Weibull, 1996) . In Section 6 we will also consider the case where a DM can play a mixed strategy , therefore our general formulas encompass this case too. To abstract away from learning issues, we interpret a mixed action also as the empirical frequency of (pure) actions actually chosen by DMs, that is, (a) is also the long run frequency with which a is chosen by the DMs who have been drawn for the stage decision problem. In a frequentist approach a la von Mises, this frequency is the "objective" probability that a DM drawn at random chooses a. 18 The probabilities that features thus have a 1 7 With a slight abuse of notation, here Im U is the smallest interval that contains [ a2A U (a; ), i.e., its convex hull. 1 8 This frequentist interpretation actually requires that the stage decisions be independent (an "ergodic"interpretation of probabilities as time averages hold, however, more generally; see Lith, 2001 , and the references therein).
dual, classical and frequentist, interpretation as both population distributions and empirical frequencies. Such duality relies, heuristically, on a "long run" that is long and stationary enough for asymptotic ergodic-type results to hold.
A similar dual interpretation applies to , where (!) is both the classical probability with which Nature (regarded as a random device) selects state ! at each stage and the empirical frequency of such state.
In view of all this, mixed messages of (M ) can be interpreted as long run frequency distributions of messages received by DMs, so that (m) is the empirical frequency of message m. In particular, the pushforward mapF : (A) ( ) ! (M ) associates to each pro…le ( ; ) the message distribution (1), which, as argued before, is the probability that a DM observes message m given an action distribution and a model . Because of the dual nature of and , such probability is both the "objective" probability that each stage generates message m and the empirical frequency with which DMs receive such message.
). Its inverse correspondenceF 1 partitions ( ) in classeŝ
of models that are observationally equivalent given that is played and the frequency distribution of messages is "observed"in the long run. In other words,F 1 ( ) is the collection of all models that may have generated given .
The inverse correspondence is compact valued. It is a function if and only ifF is oneto-one; in this case the decision problem is identi…ed under . Di¤erent models generate di¤erent message distributions which thus uniquely pin down models. It is the counterpart in our setup of the classic notion of identi…ability (see, e.g., Rothenberg, 1971 ). Accordingly, we only have partial identi…cation whenF is not one-to-one. In the extreme case when F is constant -that is, all models generate the same message distribution -the decision problem is completely unidenti…ed.
For each 2 (A), consider the correspondencê
For any …xed 2 ( ), the imagê
is the collection of models that are observationally equivalent given and the message distribution =F ( ) that generates along with model . We can thus regard^ ( ; ) as the identi…cation correspondence determined by . It is easily seen to be convex and compact valued, as well as nonempty since 2^ ( ; ). It is a function if and only ifF is one-to-one. In this case,^ ( ; ) is the identity function, witĥ ( ; ) = for all 2 ( ), and so message distributions identify the true model.
Given a mixed strategy , its identi…cation correspondence partitions ( ) in setŝ ( ; ) of observationally equivalent models. Next we show that, under the observable payo¤ assumption, such models share the same expected utility, that is, the function U ( ; ) :
( ) ! R is measurable with respect to the partition determined by^ ( ; ).
Lemma 1 Under observable payo¤ s, given any 2 ( ) and any 2 (A), it holds
The lemma captures formally the status quo bias mentioned in the Introduction. For, suppose that the agent keeps playing, for example, a pure action a and that is the true model. Then, the message distributionF a ( ), with the associated set^ (a; ), is the relevant evidence for his stage decision. Since payo¤s are observable,F a ( ) determines the frequencies of the values U (a; !), with ! 2 . By de…nition, these frequencies are the same for every model in^ (a; ). Thus, the function U (a; ) must be constant on^ (a; ), that is, the agent does not perceive any model uncertainty in his evaluation of the "status quo" action a. In contrast, model uncertainty may a¤ect the evaluation of any alternative action a 0 since the function U (a 0 ; ) might well be nonconstant on^ (a; ). This kind of status quo bias plays a key role in Theorem 6: the paper main result. 19 Identi…cation correspondences with larger images exhibit a higher degree of partial identi…cation. We now show that, ultimately, such degree depends on the underlying feedback functions. To this end, given any two feedback functions f and f , say that f is coarser than
For example, if f = u (DM only observes his payo¤s) and f = Id Z (DM observes the outcome, or terminal node of the decision tree), then f is trivially coarser than f . DMs with coarser feedback functions have worse information on outcomes. Clearly, constant feedbacks are the coarsest ones, while perfect feedbacks are the least coarse.
Lemma 2 If f is coarser than f , then, for all 2 (A),
Coarser feedback functions thus determine, for each action, coarser identi…cation correspondences: worse information translates into a higher degree of partial identi…cation.
Selfcon…rming decisions
We begin with the general notion of selfcon…rming decision for the smooth classical criterion (5) . We focus on the case where DMs can only choose pure actions. Given an action distribution in the population of DMs, a key issue for this notion is whether DMs have access to some kind of public database (e.g., provided by the media), or obtain only the observations generated when they choose their action a when they are drawn (individual database). If is the true model,^ ( ; ) is the set of models consistent with the message distribution in the public database, while^ (a; ) is the set of models consistent with the individual database of a DM playing a. Though we will focus on individual databases, a similar analysis can be carried out for public ones (see also the discussion in Section 7.3).
That said, here is our general notion of selfcon…rming decision with individual databases. The goal is to describe distributions of actions/strategies that are stationary because each DM's beliefs are con…rmed.
De…nition 3
Suppose is the true model. An action distribution is a smooth selfcon…rming decision (SCD) if, for each a 2 supp , there is a belief p a 2 (^ (a ; )) such that V a ; p a ;^ (a ; ) ; V a; p a ;^ (a ; ) ; 8a 2 A
The "con…rmed rationality" condition (7) can be written as
(U (a; )) dp a ( ) and ensures that a is a best reply that takes into account the available evidence. Speci…cally, each action a chosen by a positive fraction (a ) of DMs must be a best response within A to the statistical distribution of messagesF (a ) 2 (M ) generated by selecting a when the true model is . Since the available evidence depends on the chosen action a , also the belief "justifying"a as a best response may depend on a . Since A is …nite, for any given p a the maximization problem has a solution. 20 Extreme ambiguity attitudes determine two notions of selfcon…rming decision. Speci…-cally, an action distribution is a:
(ii) Bayesian SCD if, for each a 2 supp , there is a prior p a 2 (^ (a ; )) such that
U (a; ) dp a ( ) :
Note that when the decision problem is identi…ed under all actions -that is,^ (a; ) = f g for all a 2 A and all 2 ( ) -con…rmed rationality require consistency with the true model and the smooth criterion reduces to a vNM expected utility with respect to the true model. The con…rmed rationality condition (7) becomes a 2 arg max a2A U (a; ).
2 0 Note, since we are considering the case of individual databases and is exogenously given, the equilibrium conditions only restrict the support of . But in the game theoretic extension to follow, will be the "endogenous" distribution of strategies of a co-player who is also maximizing given con…rmed beliefs and the equilibrium conditions will restrict also the probabilities of strategies in the support of .
An urn example
It may be useful to review the concepts introduced so far by means of an urn example. Consider an urn that contains 90 balls: 30 are red (R), 30 are blue (B), and 30 are yellow (Y ). In every period a DM is randomly selected from a population and is asked to bet 1 euro on the color of the ball that will be drawn from the urn in that period. The selected DMs just know that R, B, and Y are the only possible colors. After each draw the DMs are told the result of their bets, that is, whether or not they won 1 euro.
Here the state space is = fR; B; Y g, the action space is A = f1 R ; 1 B ; 1 Y g, the set of terminal nodes of the decision tree is Z = A , hence = Id Z , and the message space is M = f0; 1g. Since = Id Z , f = F : A ! f0; 1g; in particular:
and
Suppose a DM keeps betting on red, that is, his action is 1 R . As a result, he imperfectly observes the draws: he can only observe whether the color is red (message 1: he won) or not (message 0: he lost). Such DM's action prevents him from obtaining evidence on the frequency of B and Y : given his betting he only gets either message 0 or 1. In particular,
Since the true model 2 (R; B; Y ) is such that
the evidence allowed by 1 R partially identi…es the model as an urn where one third of the balls is red:^
Turning to selfcon…rming decisions, set u (0) = 0 and u (1) = 1, so that payo¤s are observable and
e., betting on red, is a strict Waldean SCD. A similar conclusion can be reached for smooth selfcon…rming decisions under enough ambiguity aversion. In a Bayesian setting, each belief p 2
Therefore 1 R is supported as a Bayesian selfcon…rming decision (though not strict, i.e., the arg max is nonsingleton) in the "knife edge" case
By the symmetry of the example, a similar analysis holds for actions 1 B and 1 Y . Thus, every action distribution is a Waldean, Smooth and Bayesian SCD, but no is a "strict" Bayesian SCD.
Recurrent games
In this section we extend the previous analysis to general games, our main object of interest.
Games with feedback and ambiguity
We consider …nite extensive-form games with perfect recall and no chance moves played recurrently between agents drawn at random from large populations. Since we need not be explicit about all the details of the extensive form, we specify our notation only for some primitive and derived objects. The rules of the game directly or indirectly determine the following elements: populations, or player roles i 2 I, complete paths, or terminal histories z 2 Z, pure strategies s i 2 S i for each i 2 I, 21 a path, or outcome function : S ! Z specifying the terminal history (s) determined by each strategy pro…le s = (s i ) i2I 2 S = i2I S i , a (onto) consequence function : Z ! C specifying the material consequences c 2 C of each terminal history z 2 Z, a feedback function f i : Z ! M for each i 2 I specifying the message received ex post by an agent playing in role i as a function of the terminal history z.
It may be useful to think of the above elements as what can be implemented in a laboratory experiment. In particular, the designer speci…es the rules. Such rules include the ex post information feedback f = (f i ) i2I , which typically does not appear in the standard mathematical de…nition of game, and a function = ( i ) i2I : Z ! C R I that gives the monetary payo¤ distributions induced by sequences of actions. On the other hand, the designer cannot control subjects'preferences, notably absent from the above list.
But, as analysts, we need to specify preferences over objective and subjective lotteries of consequences. We assume for simplicity that populations are homogeneous, that is, all agents in the same population i 2 I have the same preferences (the extension to heterogeneous populations is straightforward but notationally cumbersome):
! R is a strictly increasing weighting function capturing i's attitudes toward ambiguity as in KMM.
Like the feedback functions f , the weighting functions = ( i ) i2I do not appear in the standard theory, as they are implicitly assumed to be linear. The standard de…nition of game is a structure 23 = (I; :::; ;
where the dots "..."refer to the details of the game tree and information structure. We keep the parameters speci…ed by …xed throughout our analysis, while we look at the e¤ects of changing f or, more importantly, .
A game with feedback is a pair ( ; f ). We say that such a game features observable payo¤ s when each payo¤ function
An important special case is perfect feedback, where each i directly observes the path, that is, M = Z and f i = Id Z for each i. 24 To anticipate, some notions of selfcon…rming equilibrium, including the standard one which assumes Bayesian agents, refer to a game with feedback. But our main equilibrium concept refers to a game with feedback and ambiguity attitudes, that is, a triple ( ; f; ).
As a matter of interpretation, we have to ascribe some knowledge of ( ; f; ) to the agents. In order to make sense of the following analysis, we informally assume that each agent in population i knows the extensive form, the feedback function f i , the random matching structure, and -of course -the vNM utility function v i and weighting function i . No additional knowledge, mutual knowledge or common knowledge of ( ; f; ) is required except in our discussion of rationalizable selfcon…rming equilibrium in Section 7.2. The assumption of no chance moves is made for simplicity, without substantial loss of generality. Chance can be modeled in this framework as a player with a constant utility function, assuming that agents have no knowledge of the objective probabilities of chance moves. The analysis can be easily adapted to incorporate complete or partial knowledge of such probabilities.
is the probability that i observes message m given the strategy distribution i of his role and the strategy distribution i of his opponents'roles. If i plays the pure strategy s i and observes the long-run frequency distribution of messages 2 (M ), then i can compute the set of (product) strategy distributions of the opponents 2 2 For example, if
, where vi is concave if i is risk averse. 2 3 Often the consequence function does not appear explicitly. We introduce it here for conceptual clarity. 2 4 Perfect feedback was assumed by Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1995) . It is also reasonable to assume that fi re ‡ects perfect recall, that is, if the sequence of information sets and actions of i determined by path z 0 is di¤erent from the sequence determined by path z 00 , then fi(z 0 ) 6 = fi(z 00 ). This, however, does not play an explicit role in our analysis because we assume that an agent takes into account the strategy he is playing when he considers the possible strategy distributions of the opponents consistent with the evidence he observes.
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that may have generated given s i : (
If i = j6 =i j is the true strategy distribution of his opponents' roles, the long-run frequency distribution of messages observed by i is the one induced by the objective distribution
The set of possible distributions from i's perspective is thus^
, the game theoretic version of (6). The identi…cation correspondence^ i (s i ; ) is nonempty and compact valued; it is convex valued in two-person games.
We obtain the decision problem analyzed in Section 2 as a special case when I = fDM; N g and u N is constant. In particular, the decision criteria previously introduced are easily extended to this game theoretic setting. Here (2) becomes
, so that the smooth criterion (5) becomes
is a belief of i on his opponents' possible strategy distributions. The Waldean and Bayesian criteria are, respectively,
To ease notation we will sometimes write V i (s i ; p i ; i ) and V i (s i ; p i ) for the smooth and Bayesian criteria, omitting the set i .
Selfcon…rming equilibrium
Next we give a general de…nition of selfcon…rming equilibrium for the smooth criterion that restricts agents to choose pure strategies, so that "mixed" strategies arise only as distributions of pure strategies within populations of agents. 25 De…nition 4 A pro…le of strategy distributions
is a smooth selfcon…rming equilibrium (SSCE) of a game with feedback and ambiguity attitudes ( ; f; ) if, for each i 2 I and each s i 2 supp i , there is a prior
This "con…rmed rationality" condition extends condition (7) to general games and can be written as s i 2 arg max
It requires that every pure strategy s i that a positive fraction i (s i ) of agents keeps playing must be a best response within S i to the "evidence," that is, the statistical distribution of messagesF i (s i ; i ) 2 (M ) generated by playing s i against the strategy distribution i .
A pro…le = ( i ) i2I is a:
(i) Waldean selfcon…rming equilibrium (WSCE) if, for each i 2 I and each s i 2 supp i ,
(ii) Bayesian selfcon…rming equilibrium (BSCE) if, for each i 2 I and each
(iii) symmetric selfcon…rming equilibrium if is a pure strategy pro…le, that is, all agents in the same role play the same pure strategy.
This de…nition of Bayesian SCE subsumes the de…nition of conjectural equilibrium due to Battigalli (1987) (see also Battigalli and Guaitoli, 1997 ) and the de…nition of SCE of Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) as special cases. Battigalli (1987) allows for general feedback functions f i , but considers only symmetric equilibria and assumes independent beliefs. 26 Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) assume that f i is the identity for each i (perfect feedback).
Like these earlier notions of SCE, our more general notion is motivated by a partial identi…cation problem: the mapping from strategy distributions to the distributions of observations available to an agent is not one to one. In fact, if for each agent i identi…cation is full -i.e.,^ i (s i ; i ) = f i g for all s i and all i -condition (8) is easily seen to reduce to the standard Nash equilibrium condition U i s i ; i U i s i ; i . In other words, if none of the agents features a partial identi…cation problem, we are back to the Nash equilibrium notion (in its mass action interpretation).
Finally, note that ambiguity aversion may give rise to dynamic inconsistency issues: as the play unfolds, an agent may have incentives to deviate from an ex ante optimal strategy. As we mentioned, we avoid this problem by assuming that i just commits to a strategy that is then automatically implemented. As well known, when agents are assumed to be ambiguity averse it is important whether randomization is explicitly allowed or not; in the latter case mixed strategies i only arise as pure strategy distributions in the population of agents who play in role i. We will see that the de…nition of SCE where agents cannot randomize is not a special case of the de…nition of SCE where agents can choose any randomization they like. In Sections 6 and 7 we will say more on this.
Comparative statics and relationships 4.1 Main result
Looking at games with feedback and ambiguity attitudes, we can carry out a comparative statics analysis in information and ambiguity. From this we also derive some results about relationships between equilibrium concepts. To this end, we say that:
(ii) an ambiguity pro…le is more ambiguity averse than if, for each i, i is more ambiguity averse than i . 27 A coarser feedback characterizes agents with less private ex post information, while higher ambiguity aversion characterizes agents with a higher dislike for model uncertainty. Clearly, any feedback pro…le is coarser than the perfect feedback pro…le f = (Id Z ; :::; Id Z ), while any ambiguity averse pro…le is more ambiguity averse than the ambiguity neutral pro…le = (Id R ; :::; Id R ).
Accordingly, we say that:
(i) game ( ; f; ) has coarser feedback than ; f ; if f is coarser than f ;
(ii) game ( ; f; ) is more ambiguity averse than ; f; if is more ambiguity averse than .
Note that the comparison of ambiguity attitudes does not require that the pro…les themselves be ambiguity averse. It only matters that one pro…le be comparatively more ambiguity averse than the other (something that can happen even if both are ambiguity loving).
We can now turn to the comparative static analysis. We begin by studying how equilibria are a¤ected by changes in information feedback. 28 Proposition 5 Suppose ( ; f; ) has coarser feedback than ; f ; . Then, the SSCEs of ; f ;
are also SSCEs of ( ; f; ), while the BSCE and WSCEs of ; f are also, respectively, BSCE and WSCEs of ( ; f ).
Worse feedback enlarges the set of opponents'strategy distributions consistent with any distribution of messages (Lemma 2) and hence enlarges the set of SCEs of each type. A similar monotonicity holds for higher ambiguity aversion. It is the paper main result, which relies on the status quo bias of Lemma 1.
Theorem 6 Suppose ( ; f; ) is more ambiguity averse than ; f; . If payo¤ s are observable, then the SSCEs of ; f;
are also SSCEs of ( ; f; ). Similarly, the SSCEs of any game ( ; f; ) are also WSCEs.
We provided intuition for this result in the Introduction. Now we can be more precise: let be a SSCE of ( ; f; ), the less ambiguity averse game, and pick any strategy played by a positive fraction of agents, s i 2supp i ; then, there is a justifying con…rmed belief
Each agent playing the "status-quo" strategy s i learns the long-run frequencies of its (observable) payo¤s; therefore, the value of s i for this agent is the objective expected utility, U (s i ; i ), independently of his ambiguity attitudes (Lemma 1). But the value of an untested strategy s i 6 = s i typically depends on ambiguity attitudes and, keeping beliefs …xed, it is higher when ambiguity aversion is lower, that is,
for all s i . This means that it is possible to support as a SSCE of the more ambiguity averse game ( ; f; ) using the same pro…le of beliefs supporting as a SSCE of ( ; f; ).
In sum, the set of SSCEs increases as either ex post private information becomes coarser or ambiguity aversion increases (or both). In particular, if we …x a game with feedback ( ; f ), Theorem 6 implies that under observable payo¤s:
(i) the set of BSCEs of ( ; f ) is contained in the set of SSCEs of every ( ; f; ) with ambiguity averse players;
(ii) the set of SSCEs of every ( ; f; ) is contained in the set of WSCEs of ( ; f ).
In other words, under observable payo¤s and ambiguity aversion, it holds BSCE SSCE W SCE:
The degree of ambiguity aversion determines the size of the set of selfcon…rming equilibria, with the sets of Bayesian and Waldean selfcon…rming equilibria being, respectively, the smallest and largest one.
As well known, every Nash equilibrium of game is a BSCE of ( ; f ); intuitively, a Nash equilibrium is a BSCE with correct beliefs. 29 
Lemma 7
If is a Nash equilibrium of , it is a BSCE of any game ( ; f ) with feedback.
Since the set N E of Nash equilibria is nonempty, we can enrich (11) as follows:
This shows, under observable payo¤s and ambiguity aversion, that every game ( ; f; ) has some SSCE and that Nash equilibria are not only BSCE, but more generally SSCE.
Payo¤ observability
The observability of payo¤ played a key role in establishing the inclusions (11) . The following example shows that, indeed, such inclusions need not hold when payo¤s are not observable.
Example 8 Consider the zero-sum game of Figure 2 of the Introduction, but now suppose that player 1 cannot observe his payo¤ ex post (he only remembers his actions). For example, the utility values in Figure 2 could be a negative a¢ ne transformation of the consumption of player 2, re ‡ecting a psychological preference of player 1 for decreasing the consumption of player 2 (not observed by 1) even if the consumption of 1 is independent of the actions taken in this game. The observability of payo¤ is actually immaterial in two-person games. In fact, for them one can show directly, without assumptions about the feedback functions, that a BSCE is also a SSCE: the proof relies on the convexity of^ i (s i ; i ) when jIj = 2 that allows to go from a justifying belief p i 2 (^ i (s i ; i )) to its predictive p i 2^ i (s i ; i ) to a new justifying belief p i 2 (^ i (s i ; i )) inducing no subjective uncertainty. 31 This argument 3 0 We show that all the strategies of 1 that do not choose O are Bayesian and smooth best replies to some beliefs. Since player 1 only remembers his actions, his beliefs are trivially con…rmed. Hence all these strategies have positive measure in some BSCE and SSCE. Let k:X 1 :X 2 denote the strategy of 1 that selects subgame M P k , with k = 1; 2, and action X 1 2 fH 1 ; T 1 g (resp. X 2 2 fH 2 ; T 2 g) in subgame M P 1 (resp. M P 2 ). Similarly, x 1 :x 2 denotes the strategy of 2 that selects action shown above (X 1 2 fH 1 ; T 1 g), player 1 is indi¤erent between the two subgames, as both have subjective value 2. Indeed, a Bayesian agent cannot strictly prefer M P 1 to M P 2 ; but there are non-degenerate priors that make the move to M P 1 a strict smooth best response. 3 1 Given the previous example, one might conclude that there is a lack of upper-hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence as the concavity of some i goes to in…nite. Such inference would be unjusti…ed: the Waldean criterion is a limit of the smooth ambiguity criterion when pi has full support in the set of possible models. But pi may have a smaller support. In particular, it may be a Dirac measure, making ambiguity aversion irrelevant, as in the argument above.
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does not work with n-person games when n 3.
Example 9 Consider the three-person, simultaneous-move game in Figure 3 , where player 1 chooses the row, player 2 the column and player 3 the matrix. Assume that player 3 has trivial feedback: he only remembers his action, hence^ 3 (s 3 ; 3 ) = (S 1 ) N (S 2
If he is a Bayesian (linear 3 ), then both`and r are best replies. But, if he is strictly uncertainty averse (strictly concave 3 ), then only r is a best reply. The predictive probability
is a correlated distribution in (S 3 ), hence it does not belong to^ 3 (`; 3 ), and
Note, however, that we can support`as a SSCE choice using di¤ erent beliefs: this is not an example where some BSCE is not a SSCE. N
Converses and equivalences
Next we consider assumptions about information implying the equivalence between the different SCE concepts (or at least their symmetric version) and also the equivalence with Nash equilibrium.
We start with a simple, but instructive result that requires a preliminary de…nition. We say that ( ; f ) has own-strategy independent feedback if what each player observes ex post about the strategies of other players is independent of his own strategy, that is, for each
. 32 This is a restrictive assumption that is violated by all of our examples. 33 The next result illustrates its strength.
Proposition 10
In every game with observable payo¤ s and own-strategy independent feedback, every type of SCE is equivalent to Nash equilibrium:
The intuition for this result is quite simple: the strategic-form payo¤ function U i (s i ; ) : S i ! R is constant on each cell F 1 s i (m) of the partition of S i induced by F s i : S i ! M (observability of payo¤s), but F 1 s i is independent of s i (own-strategy independence of feedback). This means that, in the long run, an agent does not only learn the objective probabilities of the payo¤s associated to his "status quo" strategy, but also the objective probabilities of the payo¤s associated to every other strategy. Hence model uncertainty is irrelevant and he learns to play the best response to the true strategy distributions of the other players/roles even if he does not exactly learn these distributions. 34 Assuming perfect information and perfect feedback, we can prove another partial converse to the above inclusions (11) and hence another equivalence result.
Proposition 11
In games with perfect information and perfect feedback, every symmetric WSCE is also a symmetric SSCE and BSCE where each player's strategy is justi…ed by a con…rmed deterministic belief.
Since perfect feedback implies observable payo¤s, Theorem 6 and Proposition 11 imply that under perfect information and perfect feedback 35 symBSCE = symSSCE = symW SCE:
Note that the result about symSSCE holds with either two players or n ambiguity averse players, as in both cases symBSCE symSSCE symW SCE.
Games with perfect information necessarily feature observable deviators 36 and every predictive belief p i 2 (S i ) is realization-equivalent to an uncorrelated belief q i 2 N j6 =i (S j ). In games with observable deviators and perfect feedback, every symmetric BSCE supported by uncorrelated beliefs has the same outcome as some mixed Nash equilibrium with a deterministic path and viceversa. Therefore, in games with perfect information and perfect feedback the set of terminal histories induced (with probability one) by some mixed Nash equilibrium coincides with the set (symW SCE) of terminal histories induced by a symmetric WSCE. To summarize, let detN E denote the set of Nash equilibria with a deterministic path; then it makes sense to write (detN E) for the set of these paths, and the following holds:
Proposition 12 In games with perfect information and perfect feedback
if, in addition, there are either two players or n ambiguity averse players, then
(detN E) = (symBSCE) = (symSSCE) = (symW SCE) :
A zero-sum example
In this section we analyze the SCEs of a zero-sum example parametrized by the number of strategies. The game is related to the Matching Pennies example of the Introduction. We show how the SSCE set gradually expands from the BSCE set to the WSCE set as the degree of ambiguity aversion increases.
To help intuition, we …rst consider a generalization of the game of Figure 2 : player 1 chooses between an outside option O and n Matching-Pennies subgames against player 2. Subgames with a higher index k have "higher stakes," that is, a higher (mixed) maxmin value, but a lower minimum payo¤ (see Figure 4) . The game of Figure 2 obtains for n = 2. Figure 4 . Fragment of zero-sum game
In this game, player 1 has (n + 1) 2 n strategies and player 2 has 2 n strategies. To simplify the notation, we instead analyze an equivalent extensive-form game n obtained by two transformations. First, player 2 is replaced by a team of opponents 2:1; :::; 2:n, one for each subgame k, each one with the same payo¤ function u 2:k = u 1 . Second, the sequence of moves (k; H k ) of player 1 (go to subgame k then choose Head) -which is common to 2 n 1 realization-equivalent strategies -is coalesced into the single strategy H k . Similarly (k; T k ) becomes T k . The new strategy set of player 1 has 2n + 1 strategies: S 1 = fO; H 1 ; T 1 ; :::; H n ; T n g. If player 1 chooses H k or T k , player 2:k moves at information set fH k ; T k g (i.e., without knowing which of the two actions was chosen by player 1) and chooses between h k and t k ; hence S 2:k = fh k ; t k g. See Figure 4bis . We assume perfect feedback, 37 therefore the game with feedback is ( n ; f ) with f i = Id Z for each i = 1; :::; n.
Although there are no proper subgames in n , we slightly abuse language and informally refer to "subgame k" when player 1 chooses H k or T k , giving the move to opponent 2:k. The game n and the previously described game have isomorphic sets of terminal nodes (with cardinality 4n + 1) and the same reduced normal form (once players 2:1; :::; 2:n of the second game are coalesced into a unique player 2). By standard arguments, these two games have equivalent sets of Nash equilibria, equivalent BSCE and WSCE sets for every f , and equivalent SSCE sets for every (f; ). 38 That said, consider the extensive-form game n (Figure 4bis illustrates the special case 2 ). It is easily seen that, for every pro…le of strategy distributions 2 = ( 2:k ) n k=1 , it holds 39
As a result, next we provide necessary SCE conditions that partially characterize the equilibrium strategy distribution for player/role 1 and fully characterize the equilibrium strategy distributions for the opponents.
Lemma 13 For every (Bayesian, Smooth, Waldean) SCE
and every k = 1; :::; n,
Furthermore, for every and , if is a (Bayesian, Smooth, Waldean) SCE, and supp 1 = supp 1 , then also is a (Bayesian, Smooth, Waldean) SCE.
Note that these necessary conditions do not restrict at all the set of strategies that can be played in equilibrium: for every s 1 2 fO; H 1 ; T 1 ; :::; H n ; T n g there is some distribution pro…le such that 1 (s 1 ) > 0 and (14) holds. The formal proof of the lemma is straightforward and left to the reader. Informally, if subgame k is played with positive probability, then each agent playing this subgame learns the relative frequencies of Head and Tail in the opponent's 3 7 We could equivalently assume observable payo¤s. 3 8 Each pro…le
) of the new n-person game can be mapped to an equivalent pro…le ( 1; 2) of the old two-person game and viceversa while preserving the equilibrium properties. Speci…cally,
is also a behavioral strategy of player 2 in the two-person game, which corresponds to a realizationequivalent strategy distribution 2 for player 2. Similarly, any such distribution 2 can be mapped to a realization-equivalent pro…le ( 2:k ) n k=1 . As for 1, for each s1 in the new game, the probability mass 1(s1) can be distributed arbitrarily among the pure strategies of the old two-person game that select the corresponding sequence of moves (that is, either (O), or (k; H k ) or (k; T k )), thus obtaining a realizationequivalent distribution 1. In the opposite direction, every 1 of the old game yields a unique realizationequivalent 1 in the new game, where 1(s1) is the 1-probability of the set of (realization-equivalent) strategies that select the same sequence of moves as s1. 3 9 For ease of notation, in this section we denote^ 1 by^ 2.
population, and the best response conditions imply that an SCE reaching subgame k with positive probability must induce a Nash equilibrium in this Matching-Pennies subgame. Thus, the 2 -value to an agent in population 1 of playing the "status quo" strategy H k or T k (with 1 (H k ) + 1 (T k ) > 0) is the mixed maxmin value of subgame k, n 1 + k=2. With this, the value of deviating to another "untested" strategy depends on the exogenous attitudes toward model uncertainty, and on the second-order belief p 1 2 (^ 2 (H k ; 2 )), which is only restricted by 2:k (eqs. (12) and (13)). As for the agents in roles 2:1; :::; 2:n, their attitudes toward uncertainty are irrelevant, because, if they play at all, they learn all that matters to them, that is, the relative frequencies of H k and T k . Suppose that a positive fraction of agents in population 1 play H k or T k , with k < n. By Lemma 13, in an SCE the value that they assign to their strategy is its vNM expected utility given that opponent 2:k mixes …fty-…fty, that is, n 1 + k=2. But, if they are Bayesian, the subjective value of deviating to subgame n is at least the maxmin value n 1 + n=2 > n 1 + k=2. Furthermore, the outside option O is never a Bayesian best reply. 40 This explains the following:
Proposition 14
The BSCE set of ( n ; Id Z ; :::; Id Z ) coincides with the set of Nash equilibria. Speci…cally,
Next we analyze the SSCEs assuming that agents are ambiguity averse in the KMM sense. The following preliminary result, which has some independent interest, speci…es the beliefs about opponents'strategy distributions that minimize the subjective value of deviating from a given strategy s 1 to any subgame j.
Lemma 15 Let 1 be concave. For all j = 1; :::; n, p 1 ; q 1 
Intuitively, an ambiguity averse agent dislikes deviating to subgame j the most when his subjective prior assigns positive weight only to the highest and lowest among the possible objective expected utility values, i.e., when its marginal on (S j ) has the form x h j + (1 x) t j . By symmetry of the 2 2 payo¤ matrix of subgame k, he would pick within fH k ; T k g the strategy corresponding to the highest subjective weight (H k if x > 1=2). Hence the subjective value of deviating to subgame j is minimized when the two Dirac measures h j and r j have the same weight x = 1=2.
To analyze how the SSCE set changes with the degree of ambiguity aversion of player 1, we consider the one-parameter family of negative exponential weighting functions
4 0 Indeed, O is strictly dominated by every mixed strategy
where > 0 is the coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion (see KMM p. 1865). Let SSCE( ) denote the set of SSCEs of ( n ; Id Z ; :::; Id Z ; 1 ; 2 ; ::: n ). To characterize the equilibrium correspondence 7 ! SSCE( ), we use the following transformation of 1 (U ):
By Lemma 15, this is the minimum value of deviating to a subgame with payo¤s x and y. The following result states that this value is decreasing in the coe¢ cient of ambiguity aversion , it converges to the mixed maxmin value as ! 0 (approximating the Bayesian case), and it converges to the minimum payo¤ as ! +1.
Lemma 16
For all x 6 = y, M ( ; x; y) is strictly decreasing, continuous, and satis…es 
By Lemma 13, to analyze the SSCE( ) correspondence we only have to determine the strategies s 1 that can be played by a positive fraction of agents in equilibrium, or -conversely -the strategies s 1 that must have measure zero. Let us start from very small values of , i.e., approximately Bayesian agents. By Lemmas 15 and 16, the subjective value of deviating to the highest-stakes subgame n is approximately bounded below by n 1 + n=2 > u 1 (O). Therefore, the outside option O cannot be a best reply. Furthermore, suppose by way of contradiction that H k or T k (k < n) are played by a positive fraction of agents. By Lemma 13, the value of playing subgame k is the vNM expected utility n 1 + k=2 < n 1 + n=2. Hence all agents playing this game would deviate to the highest-stakes subgame n. Thus, for small SSCE( ) = BSCE. By Lemma 16, as increases, the minimum value of deviating to subgame n decreases, converging to zero for ! +1. More generally, the minimum value M ( ; n j; n + 2(j 1)) of deviating to subgame j converges to n j for ! +1. Since n j < u 1 (O) < n 1 + k=2, this means that, as increases, it becomes easier to support an arbitrary strategy s 1 as an SSCE strategy. Therefore there must be thresholds 0 < 1 < ::: < n such that only the higher-stakes subgames k + 1; :::n can be played by a positive fraction of agents in equilibrium if < n k , and every strategy (including the outside option O) can be played by a positive fraction of agents for some n k . In particular, for su¢ ciently large, SSCE( ) coincides with the set of Waldean SCEs, which is just the set = f 2 : eq. (14) holdsg of distribution pro…les satisfying the necessary conditions of Lemma 13. 41 To summarize, by the properties of function M ( ; x; y) stated in Lemma 16, we can de…ne strictly positive thresholds 1 < 2 < ::: < n so that the following indi¤erence conditions hold max j2fk+1;:::;ng M ( n k ; n j; n + 2(j 1)) = n 1 + k 2 , k = 1; :::; n 1; (16) max j2fk+1;:::;ng M ( n ; n j; n + 2(j 1)) = n 1 + "; (17) and SSCE( ) expands as increases, making subgame k playable in equilibrium as soon as reaches n k , expanding to W SCE and making the outside option O playable as soon as reaches n . Formally:
Proposition 17 Let 1 < ::: < n be the strictly positive thresholds de…ned by (16) and (17) . For every and k = 1; :::n 1,
and SSCE( ) = BSCE = N E if < 1 , while SSCE( ) = W SCE if n .
Randomization
In this section we allow agents to commit to arbitrary objective randomization devices. Credible randomizations require a richer commitment technology than assumed so far. This can be seen by focussing on static games. In such games, playing a pure strategy simply means that an action is irreversibly chosen. But there is a commitment issue in playing mixed strategies. Suppose that a particular mixed strategy i is optimal. If this is true for a Bayesian agent, then also each pure strategy in the support of i is optimal, therefore i can be implemented by mapping each strategy in supp i to the realization of an appropriate roulette spin and then choosing the pure strategy associated to the realization. On the other hand, an ambiguity averse agent who …nds i optimal, need not …nd the pure strategies in supp i optimal (within the simplex (S i )). Therefore, unlike a Bayesian agent, an ambiguity averse one has to be able to irreversibly delegate his choice to the random device. Despite these reservations, we still …nd the extension to mixed strategies worth exploring. When each agent in population i plays a mixed strategy, a mixed strategy distribution & i 2 ( (S i )) obtains. To simplify the analysis, we consider only the case in which the ensuing distributions & i on mixed strategies have …nite support. 42 For each role i, agents in population i are "endogenously"partitioned into k i "epistemic types,"and &ì is the fraction of agents in population i of type`= 1; :::; k i . In every period, agents are drawn at random and matched to play the given game. Each type`of agent in population i keeps playing some (possibly degenerate) mixed strategy ì . This generates a mixture distribution i = P k ì =1 &ì ì on pure strategies in population i. Agents of type`in population i accumulate evidence (a message in every period) that in the long run is summarized by the long-run frequencies ;ì 2 (M ), which depend on ì and i :
Hence the set of possible models for agents of type`is^ i ( ì ; i ) = f i :F i ( ì i ) =F i ( ì i )g. In the following de…nitions, we give stability conditions for a pro…le of strategy distributions ( i ) i2I interpreted as mixtures. We use superscript to denote the equilibrium concepts obtained when randomization is allowed.
De…nition 18 A pro…le of strategy distributions ( i ) i2I is a smooth selfcon…rming equilibrium with randomization (SSCE ) of ( ; f; ) if, for each i, there are a positive integer k i 2 N, a vector of weights (& 1 i ; :::&
++ with P k ì =1 &ì = 1 and a vector of mixed strategies ( 1 i ; :::;
2. ( con…rmed rationality) for each`= 1; :::; k i there is a belief pì 2 (^ i ( ì ; i )) with
A pro…le ( i ) i2I satisfying condition 1 above is a Waldean selfcon…rming equilibrium (WSCE ) of ( ; f ) if, for each i and`
and it is a Bayesian selfcon…rming equilibrium with randomization (BSCE ) of ( ; f ) if it is a SSCE of the game ( ; f; ) with ambiguity neutral players, where each i is the identity. A Smooth (Waldean, Bayesian) equilibrium pro…le is symmetric if k i = 1 for each i 2 I.
Since for Bayesian agents the value of an optimal mixed strategy is the same as the value of any pure strategy in its support, the BSCE concept gives rise to the same strategy distributions as the BSCE concept:
Indeed, BSCE is a special case of BSCE where agents do not randomize, and each BSCE is equivalent to a BSCE where agents of type`in population i are further divided into "subtypes" playing the pure strategies in the support of ì .
A symmetric BSCE is such that every pure strategy s i played with positive probability in equilibrium can be justi…ed by the same con…rmed belief p i . Thus, the symmetric BSCE concept is equivalent to the SCE with unitary beliefs of Fudenberg and Levine (1993a) generalized to arbitrary feedback.
The comparative statics results and relationships of Section 4 extend seamlessly to equilibria with randomization (the same arguments apply almost verbatim with pure strategies replaced by mixed strategies): the coarser the feedback, the larger the set of equilibria of each kind; under observable payo¤s, the set of SSCE s becomes larger as ambiguity aversion increases; under observable payo¤s and ambiguity aversion,
furthermore, the …rst inclusion holds in every two-person game with any feedback and ambiguity attitudes; in games with observable payo¤s and own-strategy independent feedback the three kinds of SCE with randomization coincide with Nash equilibrium;
in games with perfect information and perfect feedback every symmetric WSCE is also a symmetric SSCE and BSCE R where each player's mixed strategy is justi…ed by a con…rmed deterministic belief (hence, mixed strategies can only randomize o¤ the equilibrium path).
That said, allowing for randomization considerably reduces the scope for di¤erences between the BSCE, SSCE and WSCE concepts. Indeed, they coincide in every two-person game with observable payo¤s and ambiguity aversion.
Proposition 19
In two-person games, every WSCE is also a SSCE and BSCE . Hence, in two-person games with observable payo¤ s the three kinds of SCE with randomization coincide; since BSCE = BSCE it holds
Intuitively, the wedge between BSCE, SSCE and WSCE is driven by the fact that the uncertainty implied by partial identi…cation of the opponent's strategy distribution a¤ects di¤erently the "status quo" strategy played by an agent in equilibrium, which has a known objective expected utility, and the alternative untested strategies, whose objective expected utility is unknown. But the possibility to randomize reduces the extent to which model uncertainty translates into uncertainty about the objective expected utility of the best deviation. In particular, when strategies are evaluated according to the Waldean criterion, it is easy to see that the incentive to deviate from a strategy s i is stronger when randomization is allowed:
This point is illustrated by the zero-sum game discussed in the Introduction and carefully analyzed in Section 5.
Example 20 Consider again the game of Figure 2 of the Introduction, assuming perfect feedback (or observable payo¤ s). Propositions 14 and 19 imply that W SCE = N E. It is not hard to verify this directly (for simplicity, we refer to the strategies of the reduced normal form: O, H 1 , T 1 , H 2 and T 2 ; see Section 5). Mixed strategy
Therefore the outside option O cannot be a Waldean best reply within the set of mixed strategies, and 1 (O) = 0 for every 2 W SCE . Furthermore, if a positive fraction of agents played the low-stakes subgame M P 1 in an equilibrium , then they would learn that 2 (h 1 ) = 1=2 and U 1 (H 1 ; 2 ) = U 1 (T 1 ; 2 ) = 1:5, and would deviate to
, which implies that is a Nash equilibrium. N
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The two-person assumption in Proposition 19 is used to obtain the convexity of^ i ( ì ; i ), which is crucial in the proof. But we are not aware of counterexamples with more than two players.
Next we turn to the relationship between selfcon…rming equilibria with randomization and Nash equilibrium. We know that N E BSCE = BSCE in all games, BSCE SSCE W SCE in two-person games with observable payo¤s, and analogous relations hold for symmetric equilibria (in particular, every Nash equilibrium is also a symmetric BSCE ). Of course, these results hold under perfect feedback, which implies observable payo¤. Battigalli (1987) proved that, in two-person games with perfect feedback, every symmetric BSCE (a selfcon…rming equilibrium with unitary beliefs) is realization-equivalent to a mixed Nash equilibrium. With this, Proposition 19 yields the following equivalence result (consistently with our notation, we let^ ( ) denote the random path induced by the product measure = i2I i ):
In two-person games with perfect feedback, every symmetric WSCE is realization-equivalent to some mixed Nash equilibrium; thereforê
The two-person condition is tight. For instance, consider the "horse" game with three players and imperfect information depicted in Figure 1 . Path (A; a) (for any feedback structure) is supported by (Waldean, Bayesian, Smooth) symmetric selfcon…rming equilibria with randomization, but it is not a pure or mixed Nash equilibrium path. 43 
Discussion and related literature
Let us take stock of what we did. We analyzed a notion of SCE with agents who have nonBayesian attitudes toward uncertainty on the true data generating process they are facing. We argued that this uncertainty comes from a partial identi…cation problem: the mapping from strategy distributions to the distributions of observations available to an agent is not one to one. This is discussed and illustrated in the context of decision problems (Section 2) before we move to the game theoretic analysis. We used as our workhorse the KMM smoothambiguity model, which separates endogenous beliefs from exogenous ambiguity attitudes. This makes our setup particularly well suited to connect with the previous literature on SCE and to analyze how the set of equilibria changes with the degree of ambiguity aversion. According to our main result, Theorem 6, the set of SSCE expands when agents become more ambiguity averse (assuming observability of payo¤s). The reason is that agents learn the expected utility values of the strategies played in equilibrium, but not of the strategies they can deviate to, which are thus penalized by ambiguity aversion. This allows us to derive intuitive relationships between di¤erent versions of SCE and show that Nash equilibrium is a re…nement of all of them, which guarantees existence. Equivalence results are provided under speci…c assumptions on the information structure. In the core sections of the paper (Sections 3.1 and 4) we assume that agents play the strategic form of a dynamic game and can only choose pure strategies. Mixed strategies are considered in Section 6 where we put forward notions of equilibrium with randomization: on the one hand, our main results carry over to these equilibrium concepts; on the other hand, we obtain equivalence results under much weaker conditions. We developed our theoretical insights in the framework of population games played recurrently, but similar intuitions apply to di¤erent strategic contexts, such as dynamic games with a Markov structure. Our insights are likely to have consequences for more applied work. For example, the SCE and ambiguity aversion ideas have been applied in macroeconomics to analyze, respectively, learning in policy making (see Sargent, 1999 , and the references in Cho and Sargent, 2008) and robust control (Sargent and Hansen, 2008) . Our analysis suggests that these two approaches can be fruitfully merged. Fershtman and Pakes (2011) put forward a concept of "experienced based equilibrium" akin to SCE to provide a framework for the theoretical and empirical analysis of dynamic oligopolies. They argue that equilibrium conditions are, in principle, testable when agents beliefs are determined (if only partially) by empirical frequencies, as in their equilibrium concept and SCE. Their model features observable payo¤s (…rms observe pro…ts), therefore a version of our main result should apply: ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria.
We now discuss the following points: (1) We avoided dynamic consistency issues assuming that agents play the strategic form of the game. How should we de…ne our equilibrium concepts without this commitment assumption? How are our results going to be a¤ected? (2) We clari…ed that our notions of SCE make sense under minimal assumptions about agents'knowledge of the game. But under common knowledge of the game, stronger notions of equilibrium should arguably be considered. (3) Like Fudenberg and Levine (1993a,b), we assume that each agent has only access to his "personal database" of experiences in the games he played. How is the SSCE concept a¤ected if agents have access to a "public database"? (4) Fudenberg and Levine (1993b) give a steady state learning foundation to the SCE concept, is it possible to do the same for SSCE? We close with a discussion of the related literature.
Dynamic consistency
When agents really play an extensive-form game, not its strategic form, they cannot commit to any strategy. A strategy for an agent is just a plan that allows him to evaluate the likely consequences of taking actions at any information set. The plan is credible and can be implemented only if it prescribes, at each possible information set, an action that has the highest value, given the agent's belief and planned continuation. Plans with this unimprovability property can be obtained by means of a backward induction procedure on the subjective decision tree implied by the agent's beliefs. Such a procedure may have to break ties. How ties are broken is immaterial for a Bayesian agent, but matters for a non-Bayesian one. Consider two information sets of player i, viz. h i and h i , so that h i immediately precedes h i in the tree of information sets of i, and let i ( h i ; h i ) be the action at h i that leads to h i . 44 If ties at h i are broken so as to maximize the value of action i ( h i ; h i ) (and further ties are broken to maximize the value of i (ĥ i ; h i ), whereĥ i is the immediate predecessor of h i , and so on), the resulting strategy satis…es consistent planning. We can make this precise in the context of the smooth-ambiguity model, and thus provide notions of SSCE assuming unimprovability, or consistent planning. For brevity, we write SSCE to refer to such smooth selfcon…rming equilibria with dynamic consistency. What di¤erence does dynamic consistency make?
It is well known that the strategies that an ambiguity averse agent would commit to, if he could, need not be unimprovable. 45 Therefore, SSCE is not equivalent to SSCE. Furthermore, it is not obvious whether our main comparative statics result is valid with this de…nition. We can o¤er examples and intuitions based on our preliminary analysis of this issue.
Example 22
The game w given by
1nf2; 3g L; l R; l L; r R; r T 4 0 0 0 M 0 0 0 4 B w w w w Figure 6 . Game w is a three-person, common interest game with a chance move. 46 The objective 
Intuitively, he thinks that all the agents playing in roles 2 and 3 "attended the same school" and hence are doing the same thing, but he does not know what. Suppose his ambiguity attitudes are represented by 1 ( ) = p . On the one hand, actions T and M, once the matrix game is reached, have value . If 1 < w < 1:4, the unique dynamically consistent strategy is out:B, which is also an SSCE supported by belief p 1 , for any f , 2 , and 3 . But, under perfect feedback, there is no SSCE (with commitment) supported by such beliefs: the set of best responses to p 1 is fin:T; in:Mg, but playing in reveals the true strategy distributions of agents playing in roles 2 and 3 (out is supported as an SSCE with commitment under di¤ erent beliefs). N
The following example shows that a naive extension of our main result, Theorem 6, to SSCE does not hold. Speci…cally, there are games ( ; f; ) and ( ; f; ), with the former more ambiguity averse than the latter, and a pro…le of strategy distributions that is a SSCE of ( ; f; ) but not a SSCE of ( ; f; ). 4 5 Siniscalchi (2011) reports examples and provides an in-depth analysis of dynamic consistency under ambiguity aversion. 4 6 Numbers at terminal nodes, including the boxes in the matrix subgame, give the common payo¤; chance is labeled 0. Figure 7 . Game is a three-person, common interest game. It can be checked that out:T is an SSCE strategy if player 1 is Bayesian. There is exactly one belief supporting out:T as an unimprovable strategy for a Bayesian agent:
To see this, …rst note that out:T is unimprovable under any belief p 1 if and only if p 1 (L;`) =
, then the best response at the root is in, if maxf p 1 (L;`); p 1 (R; r)g 1 2 and minf p 1 (L;`); p 1 (R; r)g < 1 2 , then the unique best reply in the subgame is B. Next observe that player 1 is certain that the objective distribution of strategy pairs of f2; 3g is a product measure, i.e., p 1 2 ( (S 2 ) N (S 3 )), implying that p 1 is the unique belief with the predictive 
by the strict concavity of 1 , whenever p 1 is not a Dirac measure; if p 1 (L;`) 1 2 then the value of T is less than 2). Therefore, out:T is a SSCE strategy of ( ; f; ), with = (Id R ; 2 ; 3 ), but not of the more ambiguity averse game ( ; f; ). Letting 2 = 3 = Id R , this also shows that a BSCE need not be a SSCE .
Although out:T is not a SSCE strategy in the more ambiguity averse game ( ; f; ), the realization-equivalent strategy out:B is. We conjecture that the following version of the comparative statics result holds: if is a SSCE of ( ; f; ) and ( ; f; ) is more ambiguity averse than ( ; f; ), then there is a SSCE of ( ; f; ) realization-equivalent to . N There is another problem related to dynamic consistency: as in Fudenberg and Levine (1993a), the notion of best reply used in this paper allows for suboptimal behavior at unexpected information sets. For example, suppose that, in the game of Figure 1 , it is strictly dominant for player 0 (whose payo¤s are not speci…ed) to choose action R if his information set is reached. A re…ned dynamically consistent notion of SCE should require that the strategy (or plan) of 0 is R even if his information set is not reached in equilibrium. To deal with this problem we can represent players' beliefs as conditional probability systems: an agent in role i has an initial belief p i , for each information set h i he would hold a corresponding conditional belief p i ( jh i ) over the strategy distributions of the opponents, and these beliefs are related to each other via Bayes rule whenever possible (see, for example, Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999) . With this, we can give stronger versions of unimprovability and consistent planning to obtain a re…ned notion of SSCE . It can be shown that this re…nement does not change the set of equilibrium outcomes. The reason is simple: agents are not assumed to know the preferences of others and may have incorrect beliefs about the choices of others at o¤-equilibrium-path information sets. The re…nement has bite when mutual or common knowledge of the game is assumed, as discussed in the following subsection.
Rationalizable selfcon…rming equilibrium
In a selfcon…rming equilibrium agents are rational and their beliefs are con…rmed. If the game 48 is common knowledge, it is interesting to explore the implications of assuming, on top of this, that there is common certainty (probability-one belief) of rationality and con…rmation of beliefs. Interestingly, the set of rationalizable SCE s thus obtained may be a strict subset of the set of SCEs consistent with common certainty of rationality, which in turn may be a strict subset of the set of SCEs. 49 The separation between ambiguity attitudes and beliefs in the smooth-ambiguity model allows a relatively straightforward extension of this idea to obtain a notion of rationalizable SSCE. Of course, to take dynamic consistency issues into account, this notion of rationalizable SSCE should rely on a de…nition of sequential best response based on re…ned unimprovability, or consistent planning. For example, if in the game of Figure 1 action R of player 0 is strictly dominant (conditional on his information set being reached), then the only re…ned rationalizable SSCE is (A; d; R).
Selfcon…rming equilibrium with a public database
The SSCE concept de…ned in this paper, like Fudenberg and Levine's SCE, rests on the assumption that agents have only access to their personal experiences. How does this a¤ect our results? The answer is quite straightforward if, like Fudenberg and Levine, we assume perfect feedback. In this case, the "public database" induced a by pro…le of strategy distributions is^ ( ) 2 (Z). The key observation is that the "personal database" of an agent playing s i 2 supp i is subsumed by the "public database": personal experiences allow to learn the conditional frequencies of opponents'actions at the opponents'information sets visited with positive frequency under (s i ; i ), a sub-collection of the collection of opponents' information sets visited with positive frequency under ( i ; i ). Therefore is a public SSCE if for each i and s i 2 supp i there is some p i 2^ i ( ) = f i : 9 i 2 (S i );^ ( i ; i ) =^ ( )g such that s i is a smooth best response to p i . (It can be shown that this is equivalent to a de…nition of SSCE with unitary beliefs whereby the justifying belief p i must be the same for all strategies in supp i .) Our results can be adapted to this de…nition of public SSCE. If perfect feedback does not hold, the analysis is more complex. First, it is not obvious what a "public database" is supposed to be. Second, for some de…nitions of "public database," the personal database need not be subsumed by the public one. Di¤erent de…nitions of SSCE look plausible and it is not clear to us which of our main results can be adapted to such de…nitions. Fudenberg and Levine (1993,b) provide a learning foundation of selfcon…rming equilibrium within an overlapping generation model with stationary aggregate distributions. The stationarity assumption is a clever trick that allows to use consistency and convergence results in Bayesian statistics about sampling from a "…xed urn" of unknown distribution. It would be important to extend such results to the smooth-ambiguity model and SSCE, and to use results on updating of sets of priors to obtain an analogous learning foundation for the WSCE concept proposed here. Our conjecture is that, with observable payo¤s, ambiguity averse agents stop experimenting sooner than Bayesian agents. The intuition is as follows: as an ambiguity averse agent comes close to learning the probabilities of payo¤s associated to strategies played many times, the strategies tried only a few times and hence involving higher uncertainty become relatively less appealing (see Anderson, 2012) . Fudenberg and Levine (2006) obtain a re…nement of SCE based on the idea of steady-state learning with extremely patient and long-lived agents and illustrate it with an application. Similar ideas are worth exploring in the current framework.
Learning and steady states
Related literature
Several papers analyze notions of equilibrium in games where agents have non-Bayesian attitudes toward uncertainty (e.g., Dow and Werlang 1994 , Klibano¤, 1996 , Lo 1996 , Eichberger and Kelsey 2000 , Marinacci 2000 , and more recently Bade, 2011, and Riedel and Sass, 2011 and the references therein). These papers adopt the Nash equilibrium idea that players best respond to beliefs that are, in some sense, correct. We di¤er from this literature, because we only require beliefs to be con…rmed, allowing them to be incorrect. The reason is that we point to a speci…c rationale for equilibrium, i.e., that it represents a rest point of a learning process, and we take its consequences into account. Another important di¤erence with several papers in this literature is that we model beliefs as measures over strategy distributions rather than pure strategies. This follows from our population game scenario which implies the mass action interpretation of mixed strategies.
To the best of our knowledge, the papers most related to our idea of combining SCE with non-Bayesian attitudes toward uncertainty are Lehrer (2011) and Lehrer and Teper (2009) . In these papers a decision maker (DM) is endowed with a "partially speci…ed probability" (PSP), that is, a list of random variables de…ned on a probability space. The DM knows only the expected values of the random variables, hence he is uncertain about the true underlying probability measure within the set of all measures that give rise to such values. Lehrer (2011) axiomatizes a decision criterion related to the maximization of the minimal expected utility with respect to such set of probability measures consistent with the PSP. Then he de…nes a notion of equilibrium with partially speci…ed probabilities for a game in strategic form. Under his assumptions on information feedback, Lehrer's equilibrium is similar the one we obtain in the "Waldean" case. 50 To see this, note that in our approach, for each i and s i , we have a PSP: the probability space is (S i ; i ), the random variables are the indicator functions of the di¤erent messages (ex post observations), and their expectations are the objective probabilities of the messages. 51 Lehrer and Teper (2009) explicitly relate their work to the SCE literature, but the decision criterion they axiomatize for a given PSP, a kind of dual of Bewley's (2002) Knightian criterion featuring intransitivity, is quite di¤erent from those considered here.
We are not going to thoroughly review the vast literature on uncertainty and ambiguity aversion, which is covered by a comprehensive recent survey (Gilboa and Marinacci, 2011) . We only mention that in the paper we rely on the decision theoretic framework of CerreiaVioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Montrucchio (2011b) that makes formally explicit the DM's uncertainty about the true probabilistic model, or data generating process.
We brie ‡y review the literature on SCE and related ideas, which is not covered by any comprehensive survey. 52 Hahn (1973) intuitively, but quite clearly articulates the idea that an economic system is in equilibrium when agents'strategies are best replies to beliefs con…rmed by the evidence generated by the actual strategy pro…le. Later, Hahn called such states "conjectural equilibria,"but he did not provide the game-theoretic formalization that is necessary to express his original idea properly (see Hahn 1977 Hahn , 1978 . Battigalli (1987) provided a precise game theoretic de…nition of such equilibria, explicitly, but only intuitively motivating it as a characterization of rest points of learning dynamics in recurrent games. 53 Similarly to our paper, information partitions of the set of terminal nodes (complete paths) are introduced among the primitives of the framework, and it is noted that strategies in non-trivial extensive-form games cannot be perfectly observable ex post, even under the assumption of perfect feedback, i.e., of perfect ex post observability of the path. The simple reason is that contingent choices at o¤-path information sets cannot be observed. Hence, the opponents'mixed strategies consistent with observed frequencies are only partially identi…ed, leaving players in a state of uncertainty. This makes "conjectural equilibrium" a coarser concept than Nash equilibrium, although a path-equivalence result is established for two-person games. Battigalli (1987) studied conjectural equilibria satisfying two properties: (i) unitary beliefs: all the pure strategies in the support of a player's mixed strategy are best replies to the same beliefs about others, and (ii) such beliefs satisfy stochastic independence. Although worth exploring, such properties are not warranted by a rigorous learning analysis, which was …rst provided in independent work by Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (see in particular Kreps 1995, and Levine, 1993a,b) . While exploring the learning foundations for the Nash equilibrium concept, these authors realized that non-Nash states -called "selfcon…rming equilibria" -can be stationary and also asymptotically stable under learning. Roughly, what they call "selfcon…rming equilibria" correspond to Battigalli's conjectural equilibria under the perfect feedback assumption, once the unitary belief and independence assumptions are dropped. Since then, "selfcon…rming equilibrium" has been used for models with perfect feedback, and "conjectural equilibrium" for models 5 1 That is, the random varibles are the functions 1 fs 0
M ), and their expectations are the frequenciesFi(si i)(m). Clearly,^ i(si; i) is the set of distributions consistent with such PSP on (S i; i).
5 2 For partial surveys, see Battigalli et al (1992) and chapter 6 of Fudenberg and Levine (1998). Cho and Sargent (2008) brie ‡y survey the macroeconomic applications of the selfcon…rming equilibrium idea. 5 3 The …rst work in English on this notion of equilibrium is Battigalli and Guaitoli (1988) , eventually published in 1997.
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where feedback may be imperfect. 54 But this is like using di¤erent names for equilibria of games with di¤erent rules, as old oligopoly theory used to do with the Nash equilibria of di¤erent models. We think a uni…ed terminology is called for, and hence we adopted the more self-explanatory "selfcon…rming equilibrium." Lehrer (1993a,b, 1995) analyzed a similarly motivated notion of equilibrium, called "subjective equilibrium,"in the context of repeated games, where patient players have to take into account the impact of their current actions on the opponents'future behavior. They showed that when players best respond to beliefs about their opponents' repeatedgame strategies and if beliefs and strategies are such that players cannot be "surprised," then continuation-strategies and beliefs converge to a subjective equilibrium, which turns out to be realization-equivalent to a Nash equilibrium under perfect monitoring.
The set of SCE is even larger than the set of Nash equilibria, but it can be re…ned in conceptually meaningful ways. Eyster and Rabin (2005) , Jehiel (2005) , Esponda (2008) and Azrieli (2009a) proposed equilibrium notions that can be interpreted as re…nements of SCE based on the assumption that agents have simple, or naive, subjective models of the behavior of others. As mentioned in Section 7.4, Fudenberg and Levine (2006) analyze a re…nement of SCE (for a simple class of perfect information games) based on steady-state learning with extremely patient and long-lived agents. Battigalli (1987) re…ned the set of SCE by looking at those that, intuitively, satisfy a form of common belief in extensive-form rationality (see also Guaitoli, 1988, 1997) . More interestingly, and independently, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) analyzed rationalizable SCE, i.e., states where (1) players are rational, (2) their beliefs are con…rmed (but possibly incorrect), and there is common belief of (1) and (2). 55 
Proof of Lemma 2 Since f is coarser that f , there is a function ' : Im f ! M such that f = ' f . Hence, F = ' F . Fix 2 ( ) and 2 b ( ; ) (partially identi…ed set with …ner feedback), so that b
We show that 2^ ( ; ) (partially identi…ed set with coarser feedback). We have
we conclude that 2^ ( ; ).
Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Proposition 5 Let be a SSCE for the less coarse game ; f ; . By Lemma 
Next observe that, for any s i 2 S i ,
i (U i (s i ; i ))dp s i ( i ) This latter inequality paired with (19) From the above equalities and inequalities we obtain, for each s i ,
This shows that is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 11
As in Chapter 6 of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), nodes of the game tree are histories (sequences of action pro…les) h, with denoting the strict precedence "pre…x of" relation, H i is the set of histories where i moves, H i is the complement of H i within the set of non-terminal histories, the action selected by strategy s i at h 2 H i is denoted by s i (h).
To ease notation, for every pure strategy pro…le s, we write^ i (s i ; s i ) =^ i (s). We show that, if s is a symmetric WSCE, then for each i there is pure strategy pro…le s i 2^ i (s ) such that s i 2 arg max s i 2S i U i (s i ; s i ); this implies the claim. Let s = (s i ) i2I be a symmetric WSCE. By perfect information, the mixed strategy pro…les of i's opponents are realization-equivalent to correlated strategy pro…les of the coalition of players i = Infig. Given perfect feedback, for each i,^ i (s ) is therefore realization-equivalent to the convex hull of set of pure strategy pro…leŝ S i (s ) := fs i 2 S i : 8h 2 H i ; h (s ) ) s i (h) = s i (h)g:
This is the set of strategies of coalition i in a modi…ed zero-sum game between i and i where i has only one feasible action, s i (h), at each h 2 H i preceding (s ), and the payo¤ function of i is the restriction of u i on the smaller set of terminal histories thus obtained. Like the original game, this auxiliary zero-sum game has perfect information, hence it has a saddle point in pure strategies. 
is a con…rmed degenerate belief justifying s i .
Proof of Proposition 12
Let s = (s i ) i2I be a BSCE supported by belief pro…le (p i ) i2I . Consider the set of opponents of any player i as a unique pseudo-player i. By perfect information, such pseudo-player has perfect recall. Therefore the predictive belief p i 2 (S i ) is realization-equivalent to a behavioral strategy of i 2 h2H i (A(h)) (A(h) is the set of possible actions at h), which in turn is realization-equivalent to an uncorrelated predictive belief (a pro…le of mixed strategies) q i 2 N j6 =i (S j ). Thus, s is a symmetric BSCE supported by uncorrelated beliefs. Perfect information implies observable deviators. Kamada (2010) proved a generalization of the following statement: in games with observable deviators and perfect feedback every symmetric BSCE supported by uncorrelated beliefs induces the same path as some mixed Nash equilibrium. To see that every Nash equilibrium with a deterministic path is realization-equivalent to a symmetric BSCE s , take a representation of with behavioral strategies, say ; by assumption is pure on the equilibrium path. Modify o¤ the path so as to obtain a pure strategy pro…le s . Like i , also s i is a best reply to product measure i , because the o¤-the-path actions of i do not a¤ect his expected utility. Furthermore, s and induce the same path; therefore, for each i,
where n 1 + k=2 is the mixed maxmin value of subgame k, p k 1 = mrg S 2:k p 1 and p 1 is the predictive belief. Therefore O cannot be played by a positive fraction of agents in a BSCE because it cannot be a best response to any predictive belief p 1 . Furthermore, no strategy H k or T k with k < n can have positive measure in a BSCE. Indeed, by (14) , if s k 1 2 fH k ; T k g has positive probability in an equilibrium , then for every belief p 1 2 (^ 1 (s k 1 ; 2 )), the value of s k 1 is
while the Bayesian value of deviating to subgame n is maxfV 1 (H n ; p 1 ); V 1 (T n ; p 1 )g n 1 + n 2 :
Therefore, eq. (14) implies 1 (H n ) = 1 (T n ) = n (h n ) = 1 2 in each BSCE . It is routine to verify that every such is also a Nash equilibrium. Therefore BSCE = N E.
The proof of Lemma 15 is based on the following lemma, where I is the unit interval [0; 1] endowed with the Borel -algebra.
Lemma 24
Let ' : I ! R be increasing and concave. For each Borel probability measure p on I max Z I ' (x) dp (x) ; Z I ' (1 x) dp (x) 1 2
Proof. Let : I ! I x 7 ! 1 x :
Then Z I ' (1 x) dp (x) = Z I ' ( (x)) dp (x) = Z I ' (y) dp (y)
where p = p 1 . In particular, for ' = id I it follows that 1 R I xdp (x) = R I ydp (y). Thus (20) becomes max Z I ' (x) dp (x) ; Z I ' (x) dp (x) 1 2
and either R I xdp (x) 1=2 or R I ydp (y) 1=2. Next we show that for each Borel probability measure q on I such that
Denote by F (x) = q ([0; x]) and by G (x) = 1dq (x) 0q (f0g) + (1 q (f0g)) < 1 2 contradicting R I xdq (x) 1=2. Let x = inf fx 2 I : F (x) > 1=2g, then 0 < x x 1. Therefore F (1) = G (1) = 1 and for each y 2 (x ; 1), F (y)
F (x ) 1=2 G (y). For each y 2 [0; x ), F (y) 1=2 G (y). Finally, by the classic Karlin-Noviko¤ result F second-order stochastically dominates G, that is (21) holds for all increasing and concave '.
Proof of Lemma 15 Let x = 2:k (h k ). Clearly U 1 (H k ; 2 ) depends only on x and we can write U 1 (H k ; x), and similarly for T k . Let ' (x) = 1 (U 1 (H k ; x) ). By symmetry of the payo¤ matrix, ' (1 x) = 1 (U 1 (T k ; x)). Note that ' is strictly increasing and concave. Let p 2 (I) be the marginal belief about x = 2:k (h k ) derived from p 1 . Recall that q 1 is a prior such that mrg (S 2:j ) q 1 = 
